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CAUTIONARY NOTE ON SCIN'S
— by Neil E. Harl*
  The concept of self-cancelling installment notes or
SCIN's grew out of a 1980 Tax Court decision1 holding that
an arrangement involving the cancellation at the death of the
seller of the remaining payments due on an installment
obligation would not be treated as a transfer with a retained
life estate.2 The publication in 1986 of Rev. Rul. 86-723
essentially validated the concept and provided guidelines for
classifying arrangements as private annuities, SCIN's or
conventional installment sales.4 Since 1986, SCIN's have
come to be viewed as a useful planning device in some
settings.  In particular, many view SCIN's as superior to
private annuities in that SCIN's permit the seller under the
obligation to retain a security interest in the underlying
property without adverse income tax consequences.
Retention of a security interest by an annuitant under a
private annuity runs the risk of causing the transaction to be
treated as a sale with recognition of gain in the year the
obligation became effective.5
Rules on cancellation of principal
Until Estate of Frane 6 was decided by the Tax Court
earlier this year, no decision had faced directly the issue of
the relationship of the rules governing SCIN's to the
provisions enacted in 1980 requiring recognition of gain on
cancellation or forgiveness of principal payments due under
installment obligations.7 The rules on cancellation or
forgiveness of principal were enacted to combat the practice
of annual forgiveness of principal payments, typically to
family members.  The solution was to require cancelled or
forgiven principal payments to be reported as though
constructively received by the seller.  The calculation of
gain, however, differed depending upon whether the parties
were related or unrelated.8 If related, the calculations were to
use the face value of the obligation;9 in the event the parties
were unrelated, the fair market value of the obligation was
to be used.10 While the statute did not distinguish
cancellation or forgiveness of principal for purposes of
wealth transfer from cancellation or forgiveness of principal
to  help a  financially  troubled  buyer, the Internal Revenue
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Service had ruled that cancellation or forgiveness of
principal to help a financially troubled buyer would not
trigger the provisions requiring the recognition of gain.11
Estate of Frane v. Commissioner
In the 1992 case of Estate of Frane,12 a taxpayer sold
stock in a wholly-owned corporation to four children in an
installment transaction with payments over twenty years.
The promissory notes specified that the obligation would be
"cancelled and extinguished as though paid" in the event of
the taxpayer's death.13 At the time of the sale, the seller's
life expectancy exceeded the twenty-year term of the notes.
However, the seller died two years later with cancellation of
the remaining principal balance of $136,238 owed by each
child.
The Internal Revenue Service took the position that the
seller's death constituted a taxable disposition of the notes.
The Tax Court upheld the IRS, noting that the statute
required any cancellation of an installment note to be treated
as a disposition of the note.14 Thus the difference between
the seller's basis and the face amount of the obligation was
included in the seller's final income tax return inasmuch as
the transaction involved related parties.15 Five Tax Court
judges dissented on the grounds that an obligation that had
not matured could not be considered cancelled.
Lesson of Estate of Frane
The majority opinion in Estate of Frane 16 noted that the
taxpayer's problem was in using the word "cancel" in the
agreement.  While one could justifiably note that the
majority opinion in Frane elevated form over substance, it
is clear that, until otherwise resolved, drafters should avoid
using the terms "cancel," or "forgiveness" in self-cancelling
installment obligations.  Language requiring the seller to be
alive in order to receive payments under the obligation
would seem preferable to a provision referring to
cancellation or forgiveness of the remaining principal
balance under the obligation. Only time and more decisions
will tell whether even that will be successful.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor sought to avoid a
consensual nonpurchase money security interest in fishing
rods, sleeping bags, tents, tools and a camera as household
goods. The court held that the lien was not avoidable
because the items were not household goods. In re
Wheeler, 140 B.R. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1992) .
The debtor sought to avoid a consensual nonpurchase
money security interest in two television sets, various
tools, a VCR, and videotapes as household goods. The court
held that only one television set, the VCR and the tapes
were household goods against which the lien could be
avoided. In re  Brubaker, 140 B.R 460 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1992).
EXEMPTIONS.
CONVERSION. The debtor had filed a Chapter 13 case
in which the plan was confirmed.  The debtor had claimed,
as exempt, interests in two IRA's.  The debtor converted the
case to Chapter 7 and the trustee objected to the exemptions
for the interests in the IRA's, arguing that a recent state case
had declared the exemptions unconstitutional prior to the
conversion.  The court held that the debtor was not entitled
to the exemptions because as of the date of the conversion,
the exemptions were not allowed.  In re  Marcus, 1 4 0
B.R. 803 (D. Colo. 1992), aff'g , 128 B.R. 2 9 4
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
PENSION PLANS. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the
debtor elected to receive a lump sum payment from an
ERISA qualified pension and profit-sharing plan.  The
distribution was made by cashier's check made out to the
debtor's attorney.  The checks were not cashed but a
judgment lien holder sought to attach the lien to the checks.
The debtor claimed the checks as exempt pension plan
funds.  The court held that because the checks were cashier's
checks, the funds were no longer part of the pension plan
and were no longer exempt.  The debtor also argued that
because the bankruptcy case was filed before the period
allowed for rollover of the funds to an IRA, the funds
remained exempt.  The court held that the rollover period
applied only as to the federal tax liability of the debtor and
did not affect the exempt status of the funds. In re Toone,
140 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
WAGES. The debtor operated a grain hauling business
and hauled grain for two companies as an independent
contractor. The debtor claimed payments from these
companies as exempt wages under Iowa Code § 627.6(9)(c).
The court held that because the payments were received for
services performed by the debtor, the payments were exempt
as wages. Matter of Sexton, 140 B.R. 742 (Bankr.
S.D. Iowa 1992).
  CHAPTER 12  
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor was the executrix
of the deceased spouse's estate. The deceased spouse's parent,
a creditor of the debtor and the deceased spouse's estate, filed
a petition in the probate case seeking to remove the debtor
as executrix.  The court held that the probate petition
violated the automatic stay under Section 362(a)(1) and
could be enjoined. In re  Panayotoff, 140 B.R. 5 0 9
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1992).
NOTICE TO CREDITORS.  The FmHA filed a
proof of claim in the debtor's Chapter 12 case and requested
that notices be sent to the state office.  The debtors sent
notice of their proposed plan and confirmation hearing to
the state office of the United States Attorney and the FmHA
national office. The FmHA did not appear at the
confirmation hearing and argued that sufficient notice was
not sent.  The court held that the notice was not sufficient
and  ordered a new confirmation hearing. In re  Mil ler,
140 B.R. 499 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).
  CHAPTER 13  
PLAN. The debtor's Chapter 13 plan provided that the
mortgage against their residence would be divided into a
secured portion, to the extent of the fair market value of the
house, and an unsecured portion for the remainder.  The
mortgagee argued that Section 1322(b)(2) prohibited
modification of liens secured solely by the debtors'
residence.  The court held that Section 1322(b)(2) applied
